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Cross-Border Trucking: An Analysis of the Limited
Extent of Agency Authority and the Potential for
Detrimental Environmental Results as Illustrated by
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen
By Stephanie Rudell*
"I believe strongly we can have safety on our highways without
discriminating against our neighbors to the south."'
"NAFTA may be a blank check to corporate America, but we must
not sacrifice our health and clean air to cash it."2
"NAFrA has always struck me as a huge gift from the people of the
United States to the people of Mexico, if a gift that not all Americans
wished to give." 3
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: You are a resident of the United
States who has chosen to live in Los Angeles, CA, a city near the
U.S.-Mexico border. You wake up each morning and check the local
* J.D. candidate, 2006, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.A., English
Literature, 2003, California State University, Northridge. I would like to express
my gratitude to those unlucky few who had to be near me during the drafting of this
case note. Thank you so much for your seemingly endless patience.
1. George W. Bush, quoted in David G. Savage, Bush Wants U.S. Roads
Opened to Mexican Trucks, Buses, News from the Border (April 22, 2004),
available at http://www.thebta.org/syndicate/news/archives/2004_04.html.
2. James P. Hoffa, Teamsters General President, quoted in Press Release,
Teamsters Online, Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments on Cross Border
Trucking (April 21, 2004), available at
http://www.teamster.org/04news/nr _040421_1 .htm.
3. Gregg Easterbrook, quoted in Jonathan Fox, The Politics of North American
Integration, 39 LATIN AM. RESEARCH REv. 254 (Jan. 1, 2004).
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television news or the Internet to see what the daily smog conditions
will be. You are forced to make this daily smog assessment because
recently your city has become inundated with motor vehicles from
Mexico that are not regulated by United States emissions laws.
These foreign vehicles have high emissions rates and contribute more
than their fair share of smog to your city's air. On mornings with
particularly high smog levels, you are forced to limit your family
members' outdoor activities to protect their well-being.
While United States residents may have become accustomed to
checking smog levels and limiting outdoor activities in the 1960s and
1970s, recent decades have seen a change with the implementation of
the Clean Air Act and strict emissions laws. Not wishing to impede
this fairly recent progress, many environmental groups and private
citizens are opposed to allowing Mexican motor carriers to
commence cross-border operations, fearing that such operation will
again force United States citizens indoors due to a drastic increase in
poor air quality.
The Court's decision in Department of Transportation v. Public
Citizen,4 however, did just that - it allowed the Department of
Transportation to register Mexican motor carriers, thereby allowing
commencement of cross-border operations, without considering the
environmental effects of the carriers' United States operations. This
case note examines the Department of Transportation decision and
its implications. Part II details the historical background, including
the legislative and judicial history, of the case. 5 Part IH discusses the
factual and procedural background of the case. 6 Part IV analyzes the
Court's unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas, focusing on the
Court's analysis of the facts as they pertain to the National
Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act.7 Part V explores
the social, administrative, and legislative impacts of the Court's
decision. 8 Lastly, part VI concludes the discussion of Department of
Transportation and the analysis of its implications.9
4. Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 124 S. Ct. 2204 (2004).
5. See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
6. See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
7. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
8. See infra Part V and accompanying notes.




In an effort to preserve both the natural and political
environments of the United States and protect the country's citizens
and residents, Congress has enacted statutes and regulations and
created administrative agencies. 10 Promoting the general welfare of
the nation has also required national leaders to enter into agreements
with other countries to further the trade industry, while at the same
time attempting to maintain the integrity of the environment.l1
In 1963, Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (CAA)12 to reduce
air pollution and enhance the quality of the Nation's air.13 In
enacting the CAA, Congress noted "that air pollution prevention (that
is, the reduction or elimination, through any measures, of the amount
of pollutants produced or created at the source) and air pollution
control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local
governments."' 14  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
establishes national air quality standards pursuant to section 109 of
the CAA. 15 To maintain these national standards, the EPA enacted
the conformity rule, which placed the responsibility on federal
agencies to analyze the emissions resulting from their actions,
thereby ensuring that government entities were not supporting
activities that were not compliant with air quality standards. 16 The
CAA "prohibits federal agencies from approving, accepting, or
funding any transportation plan, program, or project unless such plan,
program, or project" conforms with the CAA. 17
In 1969, Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy
10. See infra notes 12-44 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
12. Clean Air Act, codified at 42 U.S.C §§ 7401-7671 (2004).
13. Id. The purpose of the CAA is to protect the general population and
stimulate research and prevention of air pollution. Id. at § 7401(b)(1)-(4).
14. § 7401(a)(3).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2004).
16. See William B. Johnson, Annotation, Conformity Requirements of§ 176(c)
of Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7506(c), 157 A.L.R. Fed. 217 (2004). The
conformity rule was enacted in the 1970s and strengthened by amendments in the
1990s. Id. at 229-30.
17. Id.
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Act (NEPA) 18 to further regulate the effects of human living on the
environment. 19 Congress declared the purpose of NEPA as follows:
To declare a national policy which will encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and
his environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man;
to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems
and natural resources important to the Nation; and to
establish a Council on Environmental Quality.20
In keeping with its intended purpose, NEPA attempts to secure a
positive future for the environment by mandating that agency
administrators fully evaluate the ramifications of agency decisions
before taking "major Federal action" by preparing an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS). 21 This evaluation, in the form of an EIS,
should include the impact of the action, unavoidable adverse effects,
alternatives, a discussion of the relationship between use of the
environment and productivity, and "irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources" if the action is implemented.
22
Compliance with NEPA is achieved if analysis and disclosure
methods and procedures are followed.23 Of course, what constitutes
"major Federal action" is usually an issue for the courts to decide, as
it is not defined in the statute.24
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2004).
19. See Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 2003).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
21. Id. § 4332(C) (2004). Proposals for legislation or other "major Federal
action" that will "significantly [affect] the quality of the human environment"
require a detailed statement of how the action will impact the environment. Id.
22. Id. "Environmental impact statements shall be concise, clear, and to the
point, and shall be supported by evidence that agencies have made the necessary
environmental analyses." Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(b) (2004).
23. See Kevin Priester & James A. Kent, Using Social Ecology to Meet the
Productive Harmony Intent of the National Environmental Policy Act, 7 HASTINGS
W.- Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 235, 236-37 (2001).
24. See Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Environmental Impact
Statements under § 102(2)(c) of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(c)) in Cases Involving Regulation of Private Enterprise, 76
NEPA established the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ)
to issue regulations interpreting NEPA and guide agencies in
determining what actions are subject to NEPA's requirements.25
CEQ allows an agency to initially forego preparing an EIS and
prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA), which is a much less
detailed document, if the agency is unsure of whether or not a full
EIS is required.26 An EA is a "concise public document" providing
an analysis to determine "whether to prepare an environmental
impact statement or a finding of no significant impact. '"27 If the
agency determines through preparation of the EA that no EIS is
required, then the agency is required to prepare a "Finding of No
Significant Impact" (FONSI) and make this FONSI available to the
public.28 A FONSI is a brief document stating that the action in
question "will not have a significant effect on the human
environment" and "an [EIS] therefore will not be prepared. 29
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) was
created in January 2000, as an administration of the Department of
Transportation (DOT).30 The purpose of FMCSA is to further the
safety of highway transportation. 3' In particular, Congress stated that
the purpose of FMCSA is "to reduce the number and severity of
large-truck involved crashes through more commercial motor vehicle
and operator inspections and motor carrier compliance reviews,
stronger enforcement measures against violators, expedited
completion of rulemaking proceedings, scientifically sound research,
and effective commercial driver's license testing, recordkeeping and
sanctions. '"32 FMCSA is responsible for setting minimum safety
A.L.R. Fed. 902 (2004). Some guidance is given to agencies on what constitutes
federal action: "Environmental impact statements may be prepared, and are
sometimes required, for broad Federal actions such as the adoption of new agency
programs or regulations." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(b) (2004).
25. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2209-10.
26. Id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b)-(c) (2004).
27. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2004). The EA also helps ensure compliance with the
Act if no EIS is necessary and assists in preparation of EIS if required. Id.
28. Id. § 1501.4(e)(l)-(2).
29. Id. § 1508.13.
30. See 49 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2004).
31. See id. § 113(b).
32. Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, P.L. 106-159 § 4, 113
Stat. 1749 (1999).
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standards for commercial vehicles, including standards for vehicle
maintenance, loading, equipping, and the capabilities and financial
responsibilities of vehicle operators. 33 It follows, then, that FMCSA,
must also oversee inspections to ensure that these standards are
met.34 Although FMCSA is responsible for creating regulations and
enforcing inspections, it was given "limited discretion" in the
registration department. 35 The FMCSA is required to register any
applicant who is willing and able to comply with the safety
regulations and requirements and demonstrates adequate financial
responsibility. 36
In 1982, in response to concern over the negative treatment of
United States motor carriers in Canada and Mexico, 37 Congress
imposed a two-year moratorium on grants of operating authority
through the Bus Regulatory Reform Act.38 The President had the
authority to renew this moratorium every two years as necessary.
39
This moratorium provided that the United States would "not issue
any certificate to any motor common carrier, or any permit to any
motor contract carrier, domiciled in any contiguous foreign country
or owned or controlled by persons of any contiguous foreign country
in the two-year period." 40 The President also had the authority to
remove the moratorium if determined to be "in the national
interest;"' 41 however, the President extended the moratorium at every
opportunity.42 In 1996, the moratorium was made permanent by the
33. 49 U.S.C. §§ 31136, 31139 (2004).
34. Id. § 31142 (2004). "On the instruction of an authorized enforcement
official of a State or of the United States Government, a commercial motor vehicle
is required to pass an inspection of all safety equipment required under the
regulations issued under section 31136." Id. § 31142(a).
35. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2210.
36. 49 U.S.C. § 13902 (2004).
37. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2210.
38. See Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-261, 1982 H.R. 3663
(1982) [hereinafter Reform Act].
39. Id. § 6(g)(1).
40. Id. Since Mexico is a contiguous foreign country, this moratorium applied
to Mexican motor carriers attempting to enter the United States.
41. Id. § 6(g)(2).
42. In the Matter of Cross Border Trucking Servs., Secretariat File No. USA-
MEX-98-2008-0 41 (2001), available at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTAChapter_20/USA/ub9801
Oe.pdf.
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995
(ICCTA), which provided that the restrictions were to remain in
effect until rescinded by the President, who could modify or remove
the moratorium if "consistent with the obligations of the United
States under a trade agreement or with United States transportation
policy. '43 This moratorium remained in place as it pertained to
Mexican motor carriers until 2001 when President Bush modified the
moratorium to allow certain Mexican motor carriers to operate in the
United States.44
In 1992, Canada, Mexico, and the United States, entered into the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFITA).45 In creating this
agreement, the nations stated the following purposes:
STRENGTHEN the special bonds of friendship and
cooperation among their nations;
CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and
expansion of world trade and provide a catalyst to
broader international cooperation;
CREATE an expanded and secure market for the
goods and services produced in their territories;
REDUCE distortions to trade;
ESTABLISH clear and mutually advantageous rules
governing their trade;
ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for
business planning and investment;
BUILD on their respective rights and obligations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
and other multilateral and bilateral instruments of
cooperation;
ENHANCE the competitiveness of their firms in
global markets;
FOSTER creativity and innovation, and promote trade
in goods and services that are the subject of
intellectual property rights;
43. 49 U.S.C. § 13902(c)(3). See also Pub. Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1012.
44. Memorandum of June 5, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 30, 799 (June 7, 2001). See
also infra notes 55-57, 153 and accompanying text.
45. Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Free Trade Agreement, 32
I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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CREATE new employment opportunities and improve
working conditions and living standards in their
respective territories;
UNDERTAKE each of the preceding in a manner
consistent with environmental protection and
conservation;
PRESERVE their flexibility to safeguard the public
welfare;
PROMOTE sustainable development;
STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement of
environmental laws and regulations; and
PROTECT, enhance and enforce basic workers'
rights.46
With the adoption of NAFTA, a peaceful method of dealing with
disputes related to international trading was also created.47 Under
NAFTA, any disagreements are to be resolved through various
dispute resolution methods rather than through the court systems.48
In keeping with the aforementioned ideals to promote
unrestrained trading between the nations, NAFTA provided that the
United States would begin to dispose of the restriction against
Mexican motor carriers, and would permit Mexican motor carriers to
operate in the interior of the United States by the year 2000.49
However, when the year 2000 arrived, such access was not yet
granted, and Mexican motor carriers were still limited to commercial
areas near the border.50  According to the United States, Mexican
46. NAFTA, supra note 45, at 297.
47. David A. Gantz, Government-to-Government Dispute Resolution Under
NAFTA 's Chapter 20: A Commentary on the Process, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 481
(2000).
48. Id. at 484-85. There are six dispute resolution mechanisms described in
NAFTA, divided by subject matter to handle various disputes. Id. It was agreed
that dispute resolution was the best method, given that "[nlational courts do not
have or cannot exercise effective jurisdiction over most disputes between private
individuals and foreign governments, and among governments, due to the
sovereign immunity doctrine, act of state doctrine, concepts of comity, or other
legal barriers." Id. at 487.
49. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2211. See also NAFTA, supra note 45 at
Ch. 12, Arts. 1201-12.
50. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
motor carriers were not in compliance with United States safety
regulations, and the United States was thereby justified in precluding
access to the interior.5' Since Mexico believed that the United States
was not acting consistently with the terms of NAFTA by arbitrarily
restricting Mexican motor carriers to border areas, Mexico brought
the situation to the attention of a NAFTA arbitration panel.52 This
arbitration panel determined that the United States was not justified
in refusing to process applications of Mexican motor carriers to
operate in the United States.53 After finding the United States in
International Law: U.S.-Mexico Dispute on Cross-border Trucking, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 194 (2003). Mexican carriers were also granted access if en route to
Canada, or if the motor carrier was transporting passengers for international touring
purposes. In the Matter of Cross Border Trucking Servs., USA-MEX-98-2008-01
at 44.
51. In the Matter of Cross Border Trucking Servs., USA-MEX-98-2008-01 at
77-79. It has been noted that trade agreements, such as NAFTA, can create
significant environmental concerns, as is illustrated by the concern regarding cross-
border trucking. See Trade in Services and E-Commerce: the Significance of the
Singapore and Chile Free Trade Agreements, 108th Cong. (2003) (Statement of
Mr. David Waskow, International Policy Analyst & Trade Policy Coordinator,
Friends of the Earth - U.S.), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/hearing/05082003Hearing914/waskow 1457.
htm.
52. In the Matter of Cross Border Trucking Servs., USA-MEX-98-2008-01 at
41. In its complaint, Mexico asserted that "there is no valid justification for the
refusal to allow cross-border service on the basis that Mexico has not adopted a
domestic motor carrier safety regulation system compatible to that of the United
States." Id. at 113. The United States responded by stating:
[t]he Mexican safety regime lacks core components, such as
comprehensive truck equipment standards and fully functioning
roadside inspection or on-site review systems. In light of these
important differences in circumstances, and given the experience
to-date with the safety compliance record of Mexican trucks
operating in the U.S. border zone, the United States decision to
delay processing Mexican carriers' applications for operating
authority until further progress is made on cooperative safety
efforts is both prudent and consistent with U.S. obligations under
the NAFTA.
Id. at 153.
53. Id. at 259. The panel stated:
[T]he Panel unanimously determines that the U.S. blanket refusal
to review and consider for approval any Mexican-owned carrier
applications for authority to provide cross-border trucking
services was and remains a breach of the U.S. obligations under
Spring 2005 Cross-Border Trucking
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violation of NAFTA, the arbitration panel recommended that "the
United States take appropriate steps to bring its practices with respect
to cross-border trucking services and investment into compliance
with its obligations under the applicable provisions of NAFTA.
5 4
After the arbitration panel issued this decision, President Bush
determined that the moratorium, in effect as a result of the ICCTA,
had to be modified to ensure that United States transportation policies
were consistent with NAFTA.55  President Bush modified the
moratorium through the following provisions:
First, enterprises domiciled in the United States that
are owned or controlled by persons of Mexico will be
allowed to obtain operating authority to provide truck
services for the transportation of international cargo
between points in the United States. Second,
enterprises domiciled in the United States that are
owned or controlled by persons of Mexico will be
allowed to obtain operating authority to provide bus
services between points in the United States.56
These modifications opened the door for DOT to approve registration
applications for Mexican motor carriers, which would then allow
Mexican motor carriers to operate in the interior of the United
States .
Annex I (reservations for existing measures and liberalization
commitments), Article 1202 (national treatment for cross-border
services), and Article 1203 (most-favored-nation treatment for
cross-border services) of NAFTA.
Id. at 295.
54. Id. at 1299.
55. Memorandum of June 5, 2001, supra note 44.
56. Id.
57. Id. President Bush stated in the memorandum:
Effective today, the Department of Transportation will accept
and expeditiously process applications, submitted by enterprises
domiciled in the United States that are owned or controlled by
persons of Mexico, to obtain operating authority to provide truck
services for the transportation of international cargo between
points in the United States or to provide bus services between
points in the United States.
B. Judicial History
As previously mentioned, the courts often have the job of
determining what constitutes a major Federal action under NEPA.58
If an action is deemed to be a major Federal action, then the agency
must prepare an EIS detailing the effects the action will have on the
environment. While agencies are not always correct in determining
that a full EIS is not required under NEPA, the courts give the agency
decision a great deal of deference in determining how detailed the
EIS should be. This is probably due to the fact that an agency's
determination regarding an EIS will be overturned only if the agency
acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner in making the decision. 5
9
In several cases that have gone as far as the Supreme Court, the Court
has balanced the purposes of NEPA against the burden to the agency,
while still considering the extent of the agency's authority. After
balancing these issues, the Court often finds that the agency's pre-
action considerations are sufficient under NEPA.
In Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Company v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,60 the Court determined
that the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC's) environmental
analysis was sufficient under NEPA, and that an additional EIS was
unnecessary. 6 1 In this case, the ICC directed the United States
railroads to prepare an EIS and serve the EIS on affected parties after
the railroads determined, and the ICC agreed that a rate increase was
necessary. 62  The railroads received numerous comments from
affected parties in response to its EIS, and the ICC delayed the rate
increase until after it prepared and served its own EIS, which
determined that the rate increase would not have a substantial impact
on the environment. 63  Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), and other environmental groups, became
58. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
59. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2004). See also Dep't of Public Transp., 124 S. Ct.
at 2213; Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 275-76 (1989); Kleppe
v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976).
60. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures, 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
61. Id. at 327.
62. Id. at 297.
63. Id. at 297-98.
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concerned over the rate increases and asserted that an EIS was
required because the increased rates encouraged use of virgin
materials, as opposed to recycled material.64 The ICC issued a final
report, declaring the rate increase lawful, established that the
railroads were in considerable need of additional revenue, and
identified two potential areas where the rate increase could affect the
environment:
First, the increase in rail rates might divert traffic to
trucks, which are allegedly heavier polluters than
trains. Second, the increase in rates for recyclables
might discourage their use resulting in increased solid
waste - disposal of which creates environmental
problems - and an accelerated depletion of the
country's natural resources. 65
Both of these potential impacts were deemed insubstantial compared
to the railroads' need for additional revenue.66  The ICC initially
determined that an EIS, in addition to this final report, was
unnecessary but eventually prepared an expanded draft EIS, followed
by a final impact statement.67 SCRAP, seeking to prevent the rate
increases, filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which was
granted by the trial court and vacated by the Supreme Court.68 In the
trial court, SCRAP filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging
that the ICC's EIS was inadequate. 69 The trial court, holding that the
ICC failed to comply with NEPA because no hearing was held and
the ICC did not consider the environmental impact of the increases in
64. Id. SCRAP is a group of interested law students. Id. at 298.
65. Id. at 299.
66. Id. The report noted that the danger of diversion of traffic to trucks was
outweighed by the railroads' need for money and that the truck rates had similarly
increased recently, which lessened the possibility of a huge shift from railroads to
trucks. Regarding the recyclables, the report noted that the use of recyclables was
not directly related to rate increases. Id.
67. Id. at 300-01. "The main difference between the October 4, 1972, report
and the impact statement was that the latter substantially expanded on the
discussion of the underlying rate structure and the effect of rate increases on each
of the recycling industries." Id. at 301.
68. Id. at 303-04.
69. Id. at 304.
"good faith," granted the motion and ordered the ICC to prepare a
more adequate EIS, reevaluating the decision to authorize rate
increases .70
On appeal, the Court determined that the ICC's EIS was adequate
under NEPA. 71 The Court noted that the major federal action being
taken here was one to approve a general rate increase based on "the
railroads' claim of financial crisis." 72 This type of action generally
does not raise environmental issues.73 While future proceedings
based on rate challenges of individual commodities, such as
recyclables, could potentially raise such environmental issues, those
issues were not presently before the ICC. 74 The environmental issues
addressed by the ICC were those that could possibly be related to a
general rate increase, and the ICC's EIS, therefore, was not
inadequate.75
In Metropolitan Edison Company v. People Against Nuclear
Energy,76 the Court determined the extent to which NEPA required
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to consider the risk of
harm presented by a nuclear power plant to the health of the
surrounding community, and concluded that the agency made
sufficient considerations before taking action. 77 Metropolitan Edison
Company (Metropolitan) owned two nuclear power plants (TMI-1
70. Id. Because the ICC had held hearings in the past, they were required to
continue in this tradition, as it had become an "existing agency review process."
Id. The trial court found the EIS deficient in that it failed to analyze industry price
sensitivity and technology, and was therefore, not prepared in good faith. Id.
71. Id. at 319-26.
72. Id. at 323.
73. Id. at 324. The Court noted that "the entitlement of the railroads to some
kind of a general rate increase - raises few environmental issues." Id.
74. Id. The Court stated that these more specific rate increase requests are
"involved in a general revenue proceeding," such as this request for a rate increase,
"only to a limited extent." Id. Furthermore, even if it were required that the ICC's
EIS consider these specialized rate increase requests regarding recyclables, the ICC
could not require the railroads to significantly discount the transportation costs of
recyclables regardless of the environmental impact: "standard ratemaking criteria
limit the power of the ICC to force railroads to transport recyclable materials at
deficit rates no matter how much the environment would be benefited thereby and
no matter how much environmental injury would be caused by not doing so." Id.
75. Id. at 324-25.
76. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
77. Id. at 768-69.
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and TMI-2), both of which were licensed by the NRC after EIS
preparation, near Three Mile Island.78 After TMI-1 failed, concern
emerged for the safety of the citizens inhabiting the surrounding
areas, 79 and NRC ordered the plant shut down until safety evaluations
had been completed. 0 People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE) was
in opposition to the continued operation of the nuclear reactors and
submitted a brief detailing the potential harm to the population if the
reactors were permitted to operate.8' NRC opted not to consider
PANE's brief, so PANE filed a petition for review with the court of
appeals, asserting that NEPA required that the NRC consider
PANE's concerns.82 The NRC determined that a full EIS was not
required for TMI-1 to resume operation.8 3 The court of appeals held
that NEPA did require the NRC to consider and "evaluate 'the
potential psychological health effects of operating' TMI-1 which
have arisen since the original EIS was prepared, ' 84 but that PANE's
specific contentions did not need to be addressed. 85 The court of
appeals also found that a supplemental EIS considering both the
individual and community health would be necessary if the NRC
78. Id. at 768.
79. Id. at 769. During the period of concern, children and pregnant women
were ordered to evacuate the area and other inhabitants left voluntarily until the
situation was under control. Id.
80. Id. NRC published a notice of hearing, inviting public input on the issue of
whether or not "to consider psychological harm or other indirect effects of the
accident or of renewed operation of TMI- 1." Id.
81. Id. The brief stated that the reactors had already caused damage to the
inhabitants of the surrounding areas and would continue to do so if permitted to
reopen. PANE alleged that the physical and emotional effects of the reactors
included, "increased anxiety, tension and fear, a sense of helplessness and such
physical disorders as skin rashes, aggravated ulcers, and skeletal and muscular
problems." Id. at 769 n.2. PANE also alleged that the continued operation of the
reactors would result in a weakening of community stability and would deter
community growth. Id.
82. Id. at 770.
83. Id. at 770 n.4. The NRC determined that several repairs were necessary
before operation of the plant could resume, but that the environmental impact
assessment prepared was sufficient and that a full EIS was unnecessary. Id.
84. Id. at 771 (quoting People Against Nuclear Energy v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 678 F.2d 222, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
85. Id. at 77 1.
noticed new circumstances congruent with PANE's concerns.
8 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari87 and reversed, holding that
NEPA did not require the NRC to specifically consider PANE's
concerns regardless of their findings regarding the mental health of
the community.88 The Court reasoned that NEPA's goal is to ensure
that the agency reaches a 'fully informed and well-considered
decision '"'89 regarding the effect of the action on the environment,
and is not to utilize or "[develop] psychiatric expertise" because
doing so could spread agency resources too thin in performing a
function not Congressionally assigned to the agency. 90 The Court
concluded that NEPA was designed to compel agencies to consider
"the future effects of future actions," 9t and that in this case, forcing
the NRC to consider PANE's contentions would be forcing them to
consider the effects of past actions.
92
In Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen's Council,93 the Court
determined the extent to which NEPA required the National Forest
Service to consider the impact of a ski resort on forest land, and once
again determined that an agency took all necessary precautions under
NEPA.94 The Forest Service is authorized by statute to issue special
use permits to ski resorts to allow them to operate on federal land.
95
Before the permit can be issued, however, an EIS must be prepared.96
In Robertson, Methow Recreation, Inc. (MRI) applied for a special
use permit to develop a ski resort on a "pristine" piece of property in
the Washington Okanogan National Forest.97 In response, the Forest
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 779.
89. Id. at 776.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 779.
92. Id.
93. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen's Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
94. See id. at 336.
95. Id. These permits require the Forest Service to first consider the feasibility
of a project, then select a developer, and finally review a final environmental
analysis, which is followed by construction initiation. id. at 336-37.
96. Id. at 336. Because issuing a permit is considered a major Federal action
under NEPA, an EIS must be prepared before the Forest Service can issue the
permit. Id.
97. Id. at 337
Cross-Border TruckingSpring 2005
338 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-1
Service prepared an EIS 98 detailing the impact the resort would have
on the surrounding area.99 In particular, the EIS focused on the effect
the resort would have on the air quality and inhabiting wildlife and
noted that the project would have a significant impact on the air
quality of the area, but that the effects could be mitigated during both
the construction phase and normal operation.' 00  The EIS
recommended that MRI be issued a permit to build the resort, and the
Regional Forester issued the permit, ordering mitigating measures to
be undertaken.' 01
The decision to issue the permit was opposed by four
organizations, which appealed to the Chief of the Forest Service.'0 2
The Chief affirmed the permit issuance, asserting that the special use
permit only granted a license to develop the area, and did not yet
specifically permit a ski resort. 0 3 The organizations then filed a
petition for judicial review, claiming that the EIS failed to meet
NEPA requirements.' 4 The magistrate, however, disagreed and held
that the requirements of NEPA were met. 10 5 The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the mitigation strategies listed in the EIS
needed to be more final before the permit was issued, and that the
98. Id. at 338. The purpose of this EIS was to evaluate the potential for the
resort and to aid the Forest Service in its decision of whether or not to issue the
permit. Id.
99. Id. at 339.
100. Id. The EIS also specified certain actions that could be taken by the
County and Forest Service to prevent deterioration of air quality. Id. at 339-41.
Regarding the effect the resort would have on the wildlife, the EIS observed that
several species of animal would be affected, with thirty-one species decreasing in
population, twenty-four species increasing in population, and two species being
eliminated completely over the following ten years. The EIS also detailed
mitigation measures that could be taken by both state and local government. Id. at
341-43.
101. Id. at 344-45.
102. Id. These four organizations were the Methow County Citizens Council,
Washington State Sportsmen's Council, Washington Environmental Council, and
the Sierra Club. Id. at 345 n. 11.
103. Id. at 345.
104. Id. at 345-46.
105. Id. at 346. The magistrate specifically found that the EIS sufficiently
detailed the impact of the resort and that the EIS provided more than a "mere
listing of mitigation measures." Id. The magistrate also noted that the Forest
Service had not yet prepared a master plan, which would include more detailed
mitigation strategies. Id.
agency could be required to prepare a worst-case scenario.106 The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision, holding that
NEPA does not require an agency to prepare an EIS that details
specific mitigation steps that will be taken and a worst-case scenario
analysis is not required. 107
In Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council,10 8  the
companion case to Robertson,10 9 the Court determined the necessity
of a supplemental environmental impact statement as required by
NEPA regarding the Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) continued
construction of a dam.110 The dam was intended to control the water
supply and flow and was proposed in response to frequent
flooding."' The Corps prepared an EIS and began preparing for
construction in 1971.112 The EIS recommended further studies due to
"incomplete information" and a supplemental EIS was prepared in
1975. 1 13  A final environmental impact statement supplement
(FEISS) was prepared and released in 1980.114 The FEISS concluded
that the dam would impact the surrounding wildlife population, but
that some of the effects could be mitigated.115 The Corps decided to
106. Id. at 346-47. The court also noted that a worst-case scenario was
required if not enough information was available to the Forest Service at the time
of statement preparation to make a reasoned decision. Id. at 346.
107. Id. at 359. The Court held that NEPA relies on procedural mechanisms
and therefore does not require agencies to create a fully developed mitigation plan
before agency action can occur. Id. at 353. The Court also held that requiring the
agency to prepare a worst-case scenario would take the focus away from the issues
of greatest concern and relevance and focus on "highly speculative harms," which
is not the intent of the statute. Id. at 357.
108. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 360.
109. Id. at 363.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 364.
112. Id. To prepare, the Corps relocated residents, roads, and utilities, and
acquired land. Id.
113. Id. at 364-65. This supplemental EIS was never filed due to a request to
suspend the construction. After an analysis of an already completed dam was
finished, the project was again pursued. Id. at 365.
114. Id. This FEISS detailed the effect the dam would have on the water
quality, temperature, turbidity, and fish life. Id. at 365-66.
115. Id. at 366-67. Specifically, the dam would displace deer and elk,
eliminate acres of forestland, and interfere with fish spawning. The report noted
that the latter consequence could be mitigated by the creation of a hatchery. Id.
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continue construction of the dam, and four Oregon corporations filed
an action to enjoin construction, claiming that the Corps had violated
NEPA." 6 The district court judge denied relief on all NEPA claims,
finding that the agency's actions in preparing the EIS and the
supplemental EIS were reasonable." 7 The court of appeals reversed
using the same standard of reasonableness, holding that the Corps
erred in not preparing a second supplemental EIS. t t 8 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that while NEPA does sometimes call for a
supplemental EIS, 119 the Corps' decision here was well-reasoned and
not arbitrary and capricious.' 20
In Kleppe v. Sierra Club,121 the Court determined how extensive
the Department of the Interior's (Department) EIS regarding coal
reserves was required to be, ultimately determining that practicality
considerations outweighed thoroughness. 122  Officials of the
Department were "responsible for issuing coal leases, approving
mining plans [and enabling parties] to develop coal reserves" on
federal land.123 Environmental groups were concerned with the coal
industry's interest in the "Northern Great Plains Region," and
asserted that the Department could not allow any further
116. Id. at 368. These corporations claimed that NEPA had been violated
because the Corps failed to prepare a comprehensive EIS considering "the
cumulative effects" the dams would have on the basin, failed "adequately to
describe the environmental consequences" of the dam construction, failed "to
include a 'worst case analysis' of uncertain effects," and failed "to prepare a second
supplemental EIS to review information developed after 1980." Id.
117. Id. at 368-69.
118. Id. at 369-70. The court found that a second EIS should have been
prepared given that recent documents revealed new information, which the Corps
failed to review "with sufficient care." Id. at 370. The court of appeals also
reversed on the basis of all the other NEPA claims, but the Supreme Court did not
address these findings in its opinion. See id. at 369-70.
119. Id. at 371. NEPA was created to prevent environmental damage by
ensuring agencies act only after being fully informed. Id. Supplemental EIS may
be required where "remaining governmental action would be environmentally
'significant.' Id. at 372.
120. Id. at 385. After looking at the new information presented, the Corps had
the discretion to either accept it as significant or reject it. Since the agency based
its decision to reject the information after "careful scientific analysis," it did not
violate NEPA by failing to prepare a second supplementary EIS. Id.
121. Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 390.
122. See id. at 394.
123. Id. at 395.
development unless an EIS was first prepared. 124  The trial court
granted summary judgment for the Department finding no claim for
relief in the complaint. 25 The environmental groups appealed, and
the court of appeals reversed and issued an injunction against the
development of a small section of the contested region.' 26 After the
court of appeals refused to remove the injunction, the Department
appealed to the Supreme Court to stay the injunction - which the
Court did - and the Court granted certiorari. 127 The Supreme Court
then reversed, holding that an EIS is not required for the entire
region. 128  The Court found that it would be impractical for the
Department to prepare an EIS for the entire region, 129 and a
comprehensive EIS is not required by statute.' 
30
As these cases demonstrate, the Court has a history of
interpreting agency action regarding NEPA requirements in favor of
agencies, given that the agencies prudently consider the relevant
issues presented. This is the precedent under which Department of
Transportation was decided.
HI. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After the President demonstrated his desire to lift the moratorium
on Mexican motor carrier certification (effected by a recent
arbitration panel decision stating that the United States had breached
NAFTA by precluding Mexican motor carriers from entering the
country), 13 1 FMCSA published proposed rules for comment,
124. Id. The groups claimed that the Department was required to prepare a
detailed EIS on the entire region. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The court issued the injunction despite the fact that an EIS had been
prepared regarding this small region. That EIS, however, was not presented to the
trial court or the court of appeals. Id.
127. Id. at 396.
128. Id. at 414-15
129. Id. at 401. The Court noted that the entire area had not been slated for
development yet, and an EIS can only be prepared after a plan has been formed and
the level of "coal-related activity" can be determined. Id. at 401-02.
130. Id. at 401. The Court points out that an EIS preparation is required "only
in the event of a proposed action." Id.
131. Mexico became increasingly agitated at the ban of Mexican motor
carriers from American soil, and in February 2001, an international arbitration
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including the Application Rule and the Safety Monitoring Rule,
32
regarding safety regulations of the Mexican motor carriers.'
33
However, in December 2001, Congress passed the Department of
Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act
(Appropriations Act), 134 which specified regulation requirements
panel determined that the United States had breached NAFTA obligations by wide
denial of Mexican motor carrier applications. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2211.
The President then initiated the creation of safety regulations to direct "grants of
operating authority to Mexican motor carriers." Id.
132. These rules were proposed in May 2001. Id. The Application Rule
"addressed the establishment of a new application form for Mexican motor carriers
that seek authorization to operate within the United States" and the Safety
Monitoring Rule "addressed the establishment of a safety-inspection regime for all
Mexican motor carriers that would receive operating authority under the
Application Rule." Id.
133. Id.
134. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-87, § 350, 115 Stat. 833, 864-68 (2001) [hereinafter
Appropriations Act]. This Act also required a safety examination of all motor
carriers to be performed as a condition for authorization to operate in the United
States. This safety examination was to include:
(i)verification of available performance data and safety
management programs; (ii) verification of a drug and alcohol
testing program consistent with part 40 of title 49, Code of
Federal Regulations; (iii) verification of that motor carrier's
system of compliance with hours-of-service rules, including
hours-of-service records; (iv) verification of proof of insurance;
(v) a review of available data concerning that motor carrier's
safety history, and other information necessary to determine the
carrier's preparedness to comply with Federal Motor Carrier
Safety rules and regulations and Hazardous Materials rules and
regulations; (vi) an inspection of that Mexican motor carrier's
commercial vehicles to be used under such operating authority, if
any such commercial vehicles have not received a decal from the
inspection required in subsection (a)(5); (vii) an evaluation of
that motor carrier's safety inspection, maintenance, and repair
facilities or management systems, including verification of
records of periodic vehicle inspections; (viii) verification of
drivers' qualifications, including a confirmation of the validity of
the Licencia de Federal de Conductor of each driver of that motor
carrier who will be operating under such authority; and (ix) an
interview with officials of that motor carrier to review safety
management controls and evaluate any written safety oversight
policies and practices.
Appropriations Act, § 350(1)(B)(i)-(ix).
more exhaustive than those proposed by FMCSA. 135  Because no
applications could be approved until FMCSA enacted regulations,
136
FMCSA began to modify the previously proposed rules' 3 7 and
prepared an EA for the Application and Safety Monitoring Rules
pursuant to NEPA requirements.
138
In preparing the EA, FMCSA assumed, even while noting that no
135. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2211. These conditions extended to
appropriations for Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004. Id. These requirements included:
Safety exams by the DOT of all Mexican motor carriers before
they are granted conditional operating authority, [a] full safety
compliance review, with a satisfactory rating, before any
Mexican motor carrier is granted permanent operating authority,
[f]ederal and state inspectors at the border to electronically verify
the validity of drivers' licenses, [a]ll Mexican motor carriers,
granted authority to operate in the United States, to undergo
safety inspections at least every 90 days, [t]he 10 highest volume
border crossings to be equipped with weigh-in motion systems,
[t]he Department of Transportation to issue final safety-related
regulations and policies, [and] [t]he DOT Inspector General to
conduct a follow-up review at least 180 days following the first
review cited above and then annually thereafter.
Joint Council 7, News, Congress Acts to Restrict Cross Border Trucking,
at http://www.Teamstersjc7.org/congress%20acts.htm (last visited Mar. 7,
2005) [hereinafter Joint Council 7].
Furthermore, the Appropriations Act prohibited the following:
Mexican motor carriers from crossing into the United States at
any border crossing where a certified motor carrier safety
inspector is not on duty, [v]ehicles that are owned or leased by a
Mexican motor carrier, and that carry hazardous materials to
operate beyond the commercial zone, until Mexico initiates a
criminal-background-checks program for drivers carrying
hazmat, [and] [a]ny Mexican motor carrier from operating
beyond the commercial zone until the Department of
Transportation Inspector General first conducts a comprehensive
review of the DOT's ability to ensure safety on U. S. Highways.
Id.
136. Section 350 of the Appropriations Act specified that until FMCSA
enacted these regulations, "no funds appropriated under the Appropriations Act
could be obligated or expended to review or to process any application by a
Mexican motor carrier for authority to operate in the interior of the United States..
• Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2211. These conditions extended to
appropriations for Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004. Id.
137. See Pub. Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1013.
138. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2212.
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motor carriers could operate without the regulations, that the volume
of trade between Mexico and the United States would not be affected
by its issuance of regulations.1 39  The EA considered the
environmental effects of the regulations in the context of three
different scenarios: first, "where the President did not lift the
moratorium;" second, "where the President" did lift the moratorium
"but where . . FMCSA did not issue any new regulations;"'140 and
third, "where the President... modif[ied] the moratorium and where
FMCSA . . . adopt[ed] the proposed regulations." 141 FMCSA
determined that the influx of Mexican motor carriers into the United
States would not be a result of the issuance of FMCSA regulations,
but of the President's lifting of the moratorium.1 42  Therefore,
FMCSA did not deem it necessary to evaluate the impact the
Mexican motor carriers would have on the environment.143 The EA
focused on FMCSA's proposed safety and application regulations
and the potential environmental impact those regulations would
create,144 and concluded that the effects were minor and could be
mitigated or avoided. 145 Because FMCSA concluded the regulations
created no significant environmental impact, a FONSI was issued on
the same day as the EA. 146
On March 19, 2002, FMCSA issued the two interim rules,
147
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2211. Legally speaking, this scenario was not even possible. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 2212.
143. Id.
144. See id. The "environmental effects" considered "were those likely to
arise from the increase in the number of roadside inspections of Mexican trucks
and buses due to the proposed regulations." Id. Note that the EA evaluated only
the environmental effects likely to arise from the regulations themselves and their
enforcement, and did not consider the effects of the entry and operation of Mexican
motor carriers in general.
145. The effects noted in the EA included "slight increase in emissions, noise
from the trucks, and possible danger to passing motorists." Id. FMCSA concluded
that these effects would be "offset" by the reduction of trucks resulting from the
new safety regulations. Id.
146. Id.
147. Three interim rules were actually published on March 19, 2002. The
Safety and Application Rules were joined by the Certification Rule, which,
although also challenged by Public Citizen, was not discussed by the Supreme
Court. See Public Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1014.
which were published in the Federal Register, 148 as amended to
satisfy the Appropriations Act, delaying the effective date to allow
for public comment. 149  In the regulatory preambles, FMCSA
claimed it complied with the NEPA, relying on the EA and the
FONSI, and the CAA, relying on threshold emissions levels.'
50
However, national and international trucking alliances (the
Teamsters), various environmental groups, and Public Citizen
challenged the FMCSA's compliance with both NEPA and the CAA
on May 2, 2002 by filing a petition seeking judicial review of the
regulations. 151 Public Citizen is self-described as:
[A]n organization whose "members include residents
who reside along the Mexican border area in the
United States and will be negatively affected by
increases in emissions" from Mexico-domiciled trucks
if they are allowed into this country. This includes
"2,567 . . . members [who] live in greater Los
Angeles, 1,205 [who] live in the San Diego area,...
[and] 1,094 [who] live in the greater Houston area."' 152
In November 2002, to comply with the terms of NAFTA,
President Bush lifted the moratorium to allow cross-border busing
and truck services by Mexico-domiciled motor carriers, but retained
the moratorium on permits allowing services between points within
the United States, thereby maintaining some limits on the Mexican
motor carriers' United States operations.' 53  The lifting of the
148. Id.
149. The effective date on these rules was delayed until May 3, 2002. Id.
150. See id. The FMCSA determined that, under the CAA, a "conformity
review" of the regulations was not required "because the increase in emissions
from these regulations would fall below the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA's) threshold level needed to trigger such a review." Id.
151. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2212. See also Pub. Citizen, 316 F.3d at
1014. A second petition was filed on May 14, 2002 challenging the Certification
Rule. Id. at 1014. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals only considered the
standing of Public Citizen in its analysis of standing. Id. at 1015-16.
152. Id. at 1015. The court noted that these areas are the "most likely to be
affected by increased truck traffic from Mexico." Id.
153. Memorandum of November 27, 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 71, 795 (Nov. 27,
2002). See also Pub. Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1014.
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moratorium, along with FMCSA's issuance of mandatory
regulations, made it possible for Mexican motor carriers to apply for
and commence cross-border operations.'
54
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted
the petitions for review, and determined that FMCSA acted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner in not preparing an Environmental
Impact Statement, thereby setting aside the regulations. 55 According
to the court, because the regulations were environmentally
significant, FMCSA was required to consider the environmental
effects the regulations would cause.156 The court held that FMCSA's
EA failed to address the impact that the President's lifting of the
moratorium would have on the environment, which was an impact
that NEPA required FMCSA to consider.1 57 Regarding the CAA, the
court held that FMCSA was attempting to undermine the EPA
through its determination that its rulemaking actions were exempt
from the CAA requirements because they resulted in de minimus
emissions, and furthermore, the conclusion that the emissions would
be de minimus was flawed because it was based on FMCSA's
insufficient EA. 158 The court then remanded the case to the DOT to
prepare a full EIS and to evaluate regulation conformity with the
154. See Pub. Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1019.
155. See id. at 1032.
156. The court noted that FMCSA should have considered the long-term
effects that the regulations would have on the areas closest to the border. Id. at
1024.
157. The court scoffed at FMCSA's reasoning in not considering the effects
when it stated: "[FMCSA]'s analysis goes on to suggest that even if such an
increase might occur, its effects would not require consideration because it would
be a result of presidential rescission of the moratorium, not the regulations
themselves. This novel parsing of the regulations' effects fails to meet NEPA
standards." Id. at 1022. The lifting of the moratorium was a "reasonably
foreseeable" occurrence and FMCSA was therefore required to consider its effects
because NEPA requires "that environmental effects of government action be
considered 'to the fullest extent possible."' Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2004)).
158. See id. at 1030-32. The Court noted that the appellate court rejected
FMCSA's conclusion that the regulations were in conformity with the CAA
because that conclusion "reflected the 'illusory distinction between the effects of
the regulations themselves and the effects of the presidential recession of the
moratorium on Mexican truck entry."' Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2213
(quoting Pub. Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1030).
CAA. 15 9 FMCSA then filed a petition for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court for review of the Ninth Circuit's decision.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Background
Justice Thomas delivered the unanimous opinion for the Court.' 60
He begins his analysis by briefly explaining the statutory history
leading up to this case with a discussion of NEPA, the CAA, and the
creation of the FMCSA. 161  Borrowing language from Robertson,
Justice Thomas describes NEPA as a statute that prescribes
procedural requirements, but does not "mandate particular results."'
62
Justice Thomas then briefly details NEPA's requirements for
preparing an EIS, an EA, and a FONSI, clarifying when each is to be
prepared. 63 In discussing the CAA, Justice Thomas describes the
history of the CAA and significant amendments, such as the 1970
conformity requirement, that affect this case. 164 Justice Thomas then
describes the creation of FMCSA and its responsibilities as
159. Pub. Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1032.
160. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2209-19.
161. See id. at 2209-10.
162. Id. at 2209 (quoting Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350). Justice Thomas states
"NEPA establishes a 'national policy [to] encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment,' and was intended to reduce or
eliminate environmental damage and to promote 'the understanding of the
ecological systems and natural resources important to' the United States." Id.
(quoting 42 U.S.C § 4321).
163. Id. at 2209-10 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.3, 1501.4(a)-(b), 1508.9(a),
1501.4(e), and 1508.13 (2005)).
164. Id. at 2210. Justice Thomas describes the conformity amendment as a
safeguard of the CAA:
The definition of "conformity" includes restrictions on, for
instance, "increas[ing] the frequency or severity of any existing
violation of any standard in any area," or "delay[ing] timely
attainment of any standard . . . in any area" [citation omitted].
These safeguards prevent the Federal Government from
interfering with the States' abilities to comply with the CAA's
requirements.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1)(B) (2004)).
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authorized by statute. 165 Although FMCSA has many responsibilities
such as "ensur[ing] safety, establishing minimum levels of financial
responsibility for motor carriers, and prescribing federal standards for
safety inspections of commercial motor vehicles," Justice Thomas
notes that FMCSA has "limited discretion" when it comes to
registration' 66 and lacks "statutory authority to impose or enforce
emissions controls or to establish environmental requirements
unrelated to motor carrier safety."'167
Justice Thomas continues his analysis by explaining the factual
and procedural backgrounds of the case. 168 Beginning with the 1982
moratorium, Justice Thomas explains the history of the preclusion of
Mexican motor carriers and the role NAFTA played in the
modification of the moratorium. 169 Justice Thomas then continues to
describe FMCSA's actions in creating and publishing the new
Application and Safety Monitoring Rules and FMCSA's preparation
of an EA and a FONSI, and FMCSA's reliance on those documents
in its determination of compliance with NEPA and the CAA. 7 0
Justice Thomas concludes his discussion of the facts with a brief
summary of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals proceedings and
holding. 171
165. Id. at 2210.
166. Id. (internal citations omitted). See also supra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text.
167. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2210. Because FMCSA has only the
power and authority to either grant or deny registration applications based on
safety, FMCSA has no control over other aspects of the applicants' qualifications.
168. Id. at 2210-13.
169. Id. at 2210-11. Justice Thomas describes the 1982 moratorium and the
Presidential extensions of the moratorium. Justice Thomas notes that the
moratorium was partially lifted in 1994 when NAFTA was implemented to allow
for some Mexican bus services, but that the moratorium was not lifted as quickly as
NAFTA prescribed. Id. The arbitration panel proceedings and President Bush's
final decision to modify the moratorium and allow new regulations to govern the
operation of Mexican motor carriers were also discussed. Id. at 2211. See also
notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
170. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2211-12. See also supra notes 132-149
and accompanying text.
171. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2212-13. See also supra notes 155-59 and
accompanying text.
B. Compliance with NEPA
In beginning his application of the facts to the law, Justice
Thomas notes that the Court will only set aside FMCSA's decision
not to prepare an EIS if the Court determines that FMCSA's decision
was "arbitrary and capricious."'' 72  Public Citizen argues that the
FMCSA acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by issuing a
FONSI that was based on a flawed EA. 173  In response to this
argument, Justice Thomas first points out that NEPA requires an EIS
to be prepared only where the agency "will be undertaking 'a major
Federal actio[n],' which 'significantly affect[s] the quality of the
human environment. '' 74 A "major Federal action" is an action with
potentially major effects that are "potentially subject to Federal
control and responsibility."' 175 Justice Thomas defines two different
types of effects that can cause an action to be deemed a "major
Federal action": "'(a) Direct effects, which are caused by the action
and occur at the same time and place,' and '(b) Indirect effects,
which are caused by the action and are later in time or farther
removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable."",1
76
Consequently, Justice Thomas concludes that if the increase in
Mexican motor carriers and emissions was not "an effect of
FMCSA's issuance of the Application and Safety Monitoring Rules,"
then FMCSA was not required by NEPA to address the issues in the
EA, and "FMCSA's issuance of a FONSI cannot be arbitrary and
capricious."' 177
Before answering the question of whether or not the increase in
Mexican motor carriers and emissions was an effect of FMCSA's
rules, Justice Thomas points out that Public Citizen has forfeited the
172. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2213. Justice Thomas states: "An
agency's decision not to prepare an EIS can be set aside only upon a showing that it
was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."' Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
173. Id. Public Citizen claims that the EA was flawed because FMCSA did
not analyze the effects the increased operation of Mexican motor carriers would
have on the environment, basically asserting that an EIS should have been
prepared. Id.
174. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)).
175. Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18).
176. Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8).
177. Id.
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opportunity to object to FMCSA's EA on the basis that the EA failed
to address alternatives to issuing the regulations. 178 Because Public
Citizen did not mention any rulemaking alternatives and did not
suggest that FMCSA consider alternatives, FMCSA had no
opportunity to evaluate or implement any alternatives to the issued
regulations. 179 Although blatant flaws in an ES are not required to be
declared to maintain the opportunity to oppose proposed actions,
there are no blatant flaws here.' 80  Furthermore, any possible
alternatives, such as indirectly regulating emissions through more
rigorous inspection or application processes, would most likely not
make a significant impact on the air quality, illustrating the weak
connection between "environmental harms" and the "enforcement of
motor carrier safety."'' 81
Justice Thomas then considers Public Citizen's remaining
complaint: "[The EA] did not take into account the environmental
effects of increased cross-border operations of Mexican motor
carriers."182 Public Citizen argues that FMCSA was required to
consider the environmental effects because Mexican motor carriers
were prohibited from operating within the United States until
FMCSA issued its regulations.18 3 FMCSA could not, under the terms
of Section 350 of the Appropriations Act, expend any funds with
regards to the applications unless and until the FMCSA issued the
Application and Safety Monitoring Rules. 84  Therefore, Public
Citizen contends that FMCSA's issuance of the regulations would
178. Id. at 2213-14.
179. Id. When challenging compliance with NEPA, persons "must 'structure
their participation so that it . . . alerts the agency to the [parties'] position and
contentions' in order to allow the agency to give the issue meaningful
consideration." Id. at 2213 (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978)).
180. Id. at 2214.
181. Id. Justice Thomas notes that even if such alternatives would be
effective, FMCSA's limited statutory mandates might not allow the agency to




184. Id. In following Public Citizen's logic, Justice Thomas states: "This
expenditure bar makes it impossible for any Mexican motor carrier to receive
authorization to operate within the United States until FMCSA issued the
regulations challenged here." Id.
cause the entry of Mexican motor carriers and accompanying
emissions, making the entry of the Mexican motor carriers
"reasonably foreseeable," which would require FMCSA to consider
the effects in the EA.185 Justice Thomas, however, points out the
flaw in Public Citizen's logic: "FMCSA has no ability to
countermand the President's lifting of the moratorium or otherwise
categorically to exclude Mexican motor carriers from operating
within the United States."' 86 While the Appropriations Act restricted
FMCSA's authority to authorize registration of Mexican motor
carriers until regulations were created, none of FMCSA's statutory
mandates were in any way modified. 187 In fact, FMCSA was still
required to approve registration to anyone in compliance with the
registration requirements, and was only prevented from approving
the registration of qualified Mexican motor carriers by the
moratorium.188 Justice Thomas notes that had FMCSA denied
authorization to a qualified Mexican motor carrier after the
moratorium was lifted, FMCSA would have been in violation of its
authorizing statute.' 89  In a footnote, Justice Thomas responds to
185. Id.
186. Id. Justice Thomas' reasoning is similar to the Court's logic in Aberdeen
& Rockfish R.R. Co., where the Court noted that the issue of recyclable rates
specifically was not before the ICC at the time of EIS preparation, and,
furthermore, the ICC did not have exclusive control over the rates the railroads
assigned to recyclables as opposed to the rates assigned to virgin materials.
Therefore, the fact that the ICC's EIS did not fully consider the environmental
effects of the rate increase in regards to recyclables did not make the EIS
inadequate under NEPA. See Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co., 422 U.S. at 323-24;
supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
187. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2214.
188. Id. Justice Thomas states:
FMCSA remains subject to the mandate of 49 U.S.C. §
13902(a)(1), that FMCSA "shall register a person to provide
transportation ... as a motor carrier if [it] finds that the person is
willing and able to comply with" the safety and financial
responsibility requirements established by the Department of
Transportation. Under FMCSA's entirely reasonable reading of
this provision, it must certify any motor carrier that can show that
it is willing and able to comply with the various substantive
requirements for safety and financial responsibility contained in
DOT regulations.
Id. at 2214-15 (emphasis in original).
189. Id. at 2215. FMCSA's authorizing statute is 49 U.S.C. 13902(a)(1).
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Public Citizen's contention that Congress backed the court of
appeals' decision when it reenacted Section 350 by asserting that this
case is about NEPA and CAA interpretations, not Section 350
interpretation. 190 Regarding NEPA and the CAA, the legal issues
disputed in this case, "Congress has been entirely silent."' 9' Justice
Thomas then states that since it is feasible for FMCSA to comply
with both Section 350 of the Appropriations Act and Section
13902(a)(1), then FMCSA must comply with both statutory
mandates. 1
9 2
Therefore, Public Citizen must rely on "but for" causation, which
is insufficient under NEPA to make an agency responsible for a
particular effect. 93 This particular causation occurs when an agency
lacks authority to prevent an environmental effect from occurring, yet
agency action is still considered the cause of the environmental
effect.' 9 4  NEPA requires more than but-for causation - NEPA
requires a "'reasonably close causal"' connection "between the
environmental effect and the alleged cause."'1 95  Here, the causal
190. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2217 n.4. After the court of appeals
decision, Congress "reenacted [section] 350 in two appropriations bills." Justice
Thomas notes that Congress usually ratifies a court's statutory interpretation by
reenacting that statute without modification. Id. (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 580 (1978).
191. Id. at 2217. The requirements of section 350 are not disputed in this case
and were not disputed in the case at the court of appeals level. Id.
192. Id. at 2215. In explaining FMCSA's obligation to comply with both
statutes, Justice Thomas states how this can be accomplished: "It can issue the
application and safety inspection rules required by [section] 350, and start
processing applications by Mexican motor carriers and authorize those that satisfy
[section] 13902(a)(l)'s conditions." Id. Justice Thomas also notes that if it were
not possible for FMCSA to comply with both statutes, there would be "an
irreconcilable conflict of laws" and section 350, being the later enacted statute,
would most likely override section 13902(a). Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. Here, the environmental effect is the increased emissions and the
agency action is the issuance of regulations. FMCSA has no authority to prevent
the increased emissions, yet FMCSA's issuance of regulations is deemed to be the
cause of such emissions.
195. Id. (quoting People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. at 774). Justice
Thomas uses language from People Against Nuclear Energy and states that in order
to determine whether an agency's actions are the cause of an environmental effect
"'courts must look to the underlying policies or legislative intent in order to draw a
manageable line between those causal changes that may make an actor responsible
connection between the cause (the regulations) and the effect (the
entry of Mexican motor carriers) is insufficient to place responsibility
for the effects on FMCSA.' 96 Under NEPA, an agency need only
prepare an EIS if the agency determines, "based on the usefulness of
any new potential information to the decisionmaking process," that
an EIS is necessary to assist in making a decision. 197 This principle
is known as the "rule of reason" and it ensures that an EIS is prepared
only if it would serve a purpose.198 NEPA requires an EIS for two
purposes:
First, "[i]t ensures that the agency, in reaching its
decision, will have available, and will carefully
consider, detailed information concerning significant
environmental impacts" [internal citation omitted].
Second, it "guarantees that the relevant information
will be made available to the larger audience that may
also play a role in both the decisionmaking process
and the implementation of that decision." 199
Here, neither purpose would require that FMCSA prepare an EIS
considering the environmental effects of the entry of Mexican motor
carriers because FMCSA has no authority to prevent the entry of
Mexican motor carriers. z00 Since FMCSA has no authority to
for an effect and those that do not."' Id. (quoting People Against Nuclear Energy,
460 U.S. at 774 n.7).
196. Id. at 2215.
197. Id.
198. Id. Justice Thomas states that "[w]here the preparation of an EIS would
serve 'no purpose' in light of NEPA's regulatory scheme as a whole, no rule of
reason worthy of that title would require an agency to prepare an EIS." Id.
Obviously, Justice Thomas is stressing the point that NEPA does not require
agencies to create an EIS for every decision the agency is faced with making;
rather, an EIS is necessary only where it would assist the agency in sorting out new
information that would help the agency with the decision-making process.
199. Id. at 2215-16 (quoting Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349).
200. Id. at 2216. Regarding the first purpose, it is irrelevant to FMCSA what
the detailed information regarding the environmental effects of Mexican motor
carrier entry entails because FMCSA must authorize registration for anyone in
compliance with the registration requirements. Regarding the second purpose,
even if the "larger audience" does become informed of the potential environmental
effects as a result of an EIS preparation, FMCSA most likely will still lack
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preclude Mexican motor carrier operation, considering the
environmental impact of such operation "would have no effect on
FMCSA's decisionmaking." 20 1  Justice Thomas then stresses the
informational purpose of an EIS by stating that an EIS serves to
"'giv[e] the public the assurance that the agency 'has indeed
considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process,'
[internal citation omitted] and, perhaps more significantly, provid[e]
a springboard for public comment' in the agency decisionmaking
process itself,"' and maintains that that purpose would not be served
here.2 °2 Regardless of the level of public awareness of the cross-
border trucking issue and its effects, public input cannot impact
FMCSA's decisionmaking in this case because FMCSA is so limited
in its exercise of authority. 20 3 Therefore, the "rule of reason" would
dictate that an EIS is not required, for the entry of Mexican motor
carriers is due to the actions of those other than the FMCSA. °4 In
fact, the effect (entry of Mexican motor carriers) is the result of the
President's lifting of the moratorium, Congress's grant of authority to
the President to do so, and Congress's limitation of FMCSA's
authority.205 After establishing that NEPA's purposes in creating an
authority to act on whatever suggestions the "larger audience" may have. See id.
201. Id. Justice Thomas again asserts that FMCSA "simply lacks the power to
act on whatever information might be contained in the EIS," again demonstrating
his belief that FMCSA's preparation of an EIS is unnecessary. Id.
202. Id. (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462
U.S. 87, 97 (1983)).
203. Id. at 2216. Justice Thomas notes the statutory purpose of NEPA is to
assist the government and public officials in making excellent decisions that have a
positive effect on the environment, and that purpose is lost on a situation like this,
making preparation of an EIS futile. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(c), 1502.1
(2003)).
204. Id. at 2216. The "rule of reason" would not force an agency to prepare an
EIS where the agency has no control over the result. The FMCSA cannot refuse to
authorize registration, so the legally relevant cause of the entry of Mexican motor
carriers is the actions of the President and Congress. Id.
205. Id. During oral argument, Justice Scalia presented to Public Citizen's
counsel the following hypothetical:
Suppose there was a "mad millionaire" who applied for a
broadcasting license from the Federal Communications
Commission and threatened to unleash millions of trucks across
the United States if he did not get it. The mad millionaire's
actions, like the president's actions, would be the cause of the
increased emissions. Would the FCC be required to file an
EIS would not be served in this case, Justice Thomas points out that
Public Citizen is now left with arguing for an EIS solely for
informational purposes that would have no effect on FMCSA's
decisionmaking process. 20 6 This is not what NEPA intended when it
imposed the EIS requirement. 20 7
Justice Thomas then discusses the "cumulative impact"
regulation and its relation to the FMCSA's situation. 20 8 Cumulative
impact is the total impact of the agency's action, including the
agency's direct action and the reasonably foreseeable actions of
others that have affected, either directly or indirectly, the agency's
action. 20 9 FMCSA, therefore, was required to consider the proposed
Application and Safety Monitoring Rules in the context of the
reasonably foreseeable actions of others, such as the President's
lifting of the moratorium, and the "incremental impact" those rules
would have as a result.210 FMCSA did comply with the "cumulative
impact" regulation, as FMCSA's EA considers the impact the lifting
of the moratorium, and the accompanying increase in Mexican motor
carriers, would have on its proposed safety rules. 211 Justice Thomas
notes that, while FMCSA was required to consider the impact of
associated actions, FMCSA was not required to treat the lifting of the
environmental impact study before denying the application?
Michael Kirkland, Analysis: Mexican Trucks, Clean Air, United Press
International (April 21, 2004).
Counsel for Public Citizen responded that the FCC might be required
to do so (as was expected considering that this hypothetical clearly
paralleled the facts of the present case). Justice Scalia scoffed at this
response and countered with a simple statement: "That's absurd." Id.
206. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2216 n.2.
207. Id. Such a purpose "overlooks NEPA's core focus on improving agency
decisionmaking." Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1, 1500.2, 1502.1 (2003)).
208. Id. at 2216.
209. Id. More succinctly defined, cumulative impact is: "'the impact on the
environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to
other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what
agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions."' Id.
(quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2003)).
210. Id.
211. Id. FMCSA's EA considered three scenarios: first, where the moratorium
remained in place; second, where the moratorium was lifted but no regulations
were issued; and third where the regulations were adopted and the moratorium was
modified to allow Mexican motor carriers. Id. at 2211. See also supra notes 140-
41 and accompanying text.
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moratorium and its consequences as the result of the issuance of the
Application and Safety Monitoring Rules. 212  Justice Thomas
remarks in passing that the other errors alleged by Public Citizen and
noted by the court of appeals are irrelevant given that FMCSA was
not required to consider "the increased cross-border operations of
Mexican motor carriers. 2 13
In conclusion of his NEPA discussion, Justice Thomas states the
Court's holding: "Where an agency has no ability to prevent a certain
effect due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions,
the agency cannot be considered a legally relevant 'cause' of the
effect. '214 Therefore, neither NEPA not CEQ requires the agency to
"consider these effects in its EA when determining whether its action
is a "major Federal action. ' '215 Justice Thomas then reasons that
since FMCSA lacked authority and discretion to prevent Mexican
motor carriers from entering the United States, FMCSA was,
therefore, not required to consider the environmental effects caused
by that entry in its EA.216
C. Compliance with CAA
Justice Thomas begins his CAA analysis by noting that Federal
agencies are sometimes required to make a conformity determination
before taking action to ensure that the action is consistent with the
CAA.217 No conformity determination, however, is required of the
agency if the action would not cause emissions exceeding the
prescribed "threshold emission rates." 218  The relevant section
provides: "a conformity determination is required for each pollutant
where the total of direct and indirect emissions in a nonattainment or
212. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2216-17.
213. Id. at 2217 n.3.
214. Id. at 2217.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2216-17.
217. Id. at 2217. An agency cannot take action "that violates an applicable
State air-quality implementation plan." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7506 (c)(1), 40
C.F.R. § 93.150). Therefore, a conformity determination must sometimes be
undertaken by the agency to ensure compliance. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 93.150(b),
93.153(a)-(b)).
218. Id. These threshold emissions rates are set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 93.153(b).
maintenance area caused by a Federal action would equal or exceed
any of the rates in paragraphs (b)(1) or (2) of this section., 219 Direct
emissions are covered emissions "caused or initiated by the Federal
action and occur at the same time and place as the action. ''220
Indirect emissions, on the other hand, are covered emissions that are
"reasonably foreseeable" but are removed in time and/or place from
the Federal action and are emissions that the agency can and will
control. 221 An emission is caused by the agency action if "the
'emissions . . . would not... occur in the absence of the Federal
action.'222
FMCSA determined that the increased inspections of Mexican
motor carriers as a result of the proposed regulations would not
create emissions exceeding the threshold levels prescribed by statute,
"and therefore concluded that the issuance of its regulations would
comply with the CAA. 223 This CAA conformity determination did
not include potential emissions caused by the increased presence of
Mexican motor carriers in the United States.224 Justice Thomas
establishes that, while the issuance of the regulations is a "but for"
cause of the entry of Mexican motor carriers, the resulting emissions
are neither direct nor indirect.225  The emissions are not direct
because the resulting emissions will occur in a place and time
219. 40 C.F.R. § 93.153(b) (2004).
220. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2217-18 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 93.152).
221. Id. at 2218 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 93.152). These are emissions that the
agency "can practicably control and will maintain control over due to a continuing
program responsibility." 40 C.F.R. § 93.152. The Court discussed indirect effects
from a psychological standpoint in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against
Nuclear Energy, where it ruled that the agency did not have to consider such
effects in its environmental evaluation, but has not before addressed the issue in
this type of context. See Katharine G. Shirey, 2003 Ninth Circuit Environmental
Review: International Implications: The Elephant in the Living Room in Public
Citizen v. Department of Transportation, 34 ENVTL. L. 961, 973 (2004). See also
supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
222. Dep't of Transp., 124 S. Ct. at 2218 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 93.152).
Therefore, "but for" causation is sufficient to establish causation in determining
conformity. See id.
223. Id. at 2217.
224. Id. Justice Thomas compares this exclusion to FMCSA's exclusion of
this same effect in its NEPA analysis. Id.
225. Id. at 2218.
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different than that of the issuance of the regulations. 22 6  The
emissions are not indirect because, while the emissions are removed
in both time and place from the issuance of the regulations, the
FMCSA cannot maintain control over then through any means.227
FMCSA lacks the authority to prevent registration and entry of
Mexican motor carriers, and furthermore would lack authority to
deny entry based on high emissions or regulate vehicle emissions
once entry is gained.228 Justice Thomas highlights the fact that
FMCSA also lacks control over registered Mexican motor carriers:
"FMCSA cannot determine whether registered carriers actually will
bring trucks into the United States, cannot control the routes the
carriers take, and cannot determine what the trucks will emit."
229
Therefore, if any of FMCSA's actions caused a reduction in
emissions, it "would be mere happenstance. 230  Since FMCSA's
proposed regulations did not lead to either direct or indirect
emissions, FMCSA did not violate the CAA by failing to consider the
emissions from Mexican motor carriers in its determination of
whether or not "to perform a full conformity determination."231
226. Id.
227. Id. Justice Thomas supports this contention by citing to an EPA
document that states that the EPA "prohibitions and responsibilities" were not
intended to extend to necessary agency decisions that produced unavoidable
consequences over which the agency maintained no control. Id. The relevant
language reads:
The EPA does not believe that Congress intended to extend the
prohibitions and responsibilities to cases where, although
licensing or approving action is a required initial step for a
subsequent activity that causes emissions, the agency has no
control over that subsequent activity, either because there is no
continuing program responsibility or ability to practicably
control. For that reason, EPA believes it is not reasonable to
conclude that the Federal agency "supports" that later activity,
within the meaning of section 176(c) of the Act.
Determining Conformity of General Federal Actions to State or Federal
Implementation Plans, 58 Fed. Reg. 63, 214 (Nov. 30, 1993).





FMCSA's failure to consider the environmental effects of cross-
border trucking in its EA did not violate NEPA and its determination
that a full conformity review was unnecessary did not violate the
CAA. 2  Therefore, because the Court determined that FMCSA did
not violate NEPA or the CAA, Public Citizen's challenges to
FMCSA's procedures in issuing the Application and Safety
Monitoring Rules were rejected.233 Justice Thomas concluded the
Court's opinion by ordering reversal of the order of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals and remanding the case back to that court for




1. American Trucking Industry (the Teamsters)
The American trucking industry has been, and will continue to
be, greatly impacted by the Court's decision. While the Teamsters
are not opposed to sharing the roads with the Mexican motor carriers,
they are opposed to the notion that the two groups will not be treated
equally and held to the same standards. 5
It has been estimated that only "about half of all Mexican trucks
crossing the U.S. border comply with current emissions
standards." 236  This implies that while all American trucks must
comply with emissions standards, only half of the Mexican motor
carriers will be forced to comply. This issue will prove increasingly
burdensome on the American truckers in 2007 when the emissions
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2218-19.
234. Id. at 2219.
235. Joint Council 7, supra note 135. Labor groups feel that under NAFTA,
all countries should have to comply with pollution regulations equally. Justin
Scheid, Court Rules Mexican Truck Operations Must Conform to State, Local
Laws; U.S. Court of Appeals; Environmental Considerations, NATION'S CITIES
WKLY., Feb. 10, 2003, No. 6, vol. 6, at 26.
236. Scheid, supra note 235, at 6.
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standards will become even stricter.237  Many Mexican trucks,
however, are still believed to use a diesel fuel that is the equivalent of
"bunker" oil, which, if true, means that their operation poses a
serious threat to the environment (far more serious than the threat
posed by their American counterparts). 8  Furthermore, since the
lower quality diesel lacks the degree of refinement the diesel
American trucks will be required to use, the American trucking
industry will be operating at costs much higher than the Mexican
motor carriers. 239  These issues will linger until there is some
regulation (beyond the basic safety regulation of FMCSA) of
Mexican motor carriers operating in the United States.
2. United States relations with Mexico
Although the Court's opinion failed to fully analyze NAFTA's
role in the case, the Court's decision has an obvious impact on the
United States' international relations. Mexico had a very real interest
in the Court proceedings because the Mexican economy benefits
from being able to engage in trade within the United States -
undoubtedly one of the reasons Mexico agreed to enter into NAFTA
with the United States in the first place. In fact, Mexico claimed that
the moratorium had cost the country more than two billion dollars.240
By initiating the arbitration panel proceedings, Mexico demonstrated
its interest in the issue, 24 1 and continued demonstrating its interest by
maintaining a presence at, and providing extensive media coverage
of, the Supreme Court hearings.242 The Court's decision, therefore, is
a victory for Mexico, and undeniably, will serve to improve
America's relations with its southern neighbor.
237. Teamsters Local 70 Online, Local 70 Takes Cross-Border Trucking to
Court, at http://www.teamsterslocal7O.org/local%2070%20takes%20cross-
border.htm. In 2007, American trucks will be required to run on ultra-low sulfur
diesel fuel. Id.
238. Joint Council 7, supra note 135.
239. Id.
240. Anne Gearan, Supreme Court: Skip Study, Let Mexican Trucks Roll, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 8, 2004, Vol. 230, No. 110, at 4.
241. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
242. Kirkland, supra note 205.
3. The American Public
The Government estimated that the lifting of the moratorium
would allow at least 34,000 Mexican motor carriers into the United
States.243 It has been pointed out that since the Court determined that
FMCSA was not required to prepare an EIS, "the actual impact of
these trucks on the nation's air quality remains unknown." 244 That
number was an initial estimation. In reality, FMCSA's statistics
demonstrate that over 76,000 basic safety inspections on carriers
domiciled in Mexico were performed in 2003 alone.245 Because
these numbers were released before the Court's decision in
Department of Transportation, so it would not be surprising if the
statistics for 2004 (not yet released) show a significant increase.
Although the actual impact of the increased emissions caused by
Mexican motor carriers is unknown, it has been speculated that the
states closest to the U.S.-Mexico border (Texas, California, and
Arizona) will be unduly burdened with increased smog.2 46 In fact, air
pollution in these states has already increased significantly as a result
of the cross-border operations. 247 Considering that many of the cities
located in these states already boast some of the highest pollution
rates in the country,248 this increase poses a significant threat, and, as
243. Michael Bhargava, In Brief: Supreme Court Allows Mexican Trucks To
Enter the United States Without Environmental Impact Assessments, 31 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 719, 724 n.49 (2004) (citing David G. Savage & Maria Dickerson, Ruling Lets
in Mexican Trucks, L.A. TIMEs, June 8, 2004, at Al).
244. Id. at 724.
245. See Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Analysis & Information
Online, NAFTA Safety Stats, available at
http://www.ai.volpe.dot.gov/International/border.asp (last visited on March 28,
2005).
246. Local 70 Takes Cross-Border Trucking to Court, supra note 237.
247. Id.
248. Many cities and states in the Unites States already struggle with CAA
compliance and improving the "quality of life" for residents. See Scheid, supra
note 235. Los Angeles, CA, San Diego, CA, Dallas, TX, and Houston, TX rank
among the nation's fifty most polluted cities. See Environmental Defense, Air in
Your City, available at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/cleanairforlife.cfm?subnav=aiyc-50cities
(last visited March 28, 2005); Anita Manning, California has the USA's Worst Air
Quality, USA TODAY, May 1, 2002, at 6D, at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2002-05-01 -air-quality.htm.
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of yet, no remedy has been presented. On the other hand, the
American public can rest assured that the executive branch of
government is working hard to ensure that international bonds are
being maintained and strengthened to promote good will towards
America and its citizens, and that United States treaty obligations are
being fulfilled.
B. Administrative Impact
While Congress attempts to maintain the integrity of the
environment through the creation of agencies and by legislatively
mandating that the agencies evaluate the environmental impact of
their actions, it also limits the extent of the agencies' authority in
acting on those evaluations. Generally, Congress has given the DOT,
specifically FMCSA, the authority to oversee highway safety by
performing safety inspections and certain limited competence
determinations, and to register and license vehicles. 249 If Congress
intended for FMCSA to be responsible for the regulation of vehicle
emissions, then it would have statutorily granted FMCSA more
authority. As of yet, Department of Transportation has not had a
distinct legislative impact in this area. Obviously, if emission
regulation and enforcement is something that Congress feels FMCSA
should be considering in its approval of vehicle registration, then
Congress must modify and expand FMCSA's enabling statute. As
demonstrated by the great public outcry elicited by the entrance of
Mexican motor carriers, an expansion of FMCSA authority may be in
order. Absent this type of Congressional action, FMCSA will
continue to lack control over the effects of the newly registered
Mexico-domiciled vehicles on the environment.
Because FMCSA's duties and obligations remain the same, the
Court's decision in Department of Transportation has not
significantly affected FMCSA. Although criticized by Teamsters in
the trucking industry, environmentalists, and concerned citizens,
there is little FMCSA can do at this time to remedy the negative
environmental effects of increased cross-border trucking operations.
The ruling in Department of Transportation reaffirms that FMCSA's
primary duty is to register vehicles that are in compliance with the
249. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
regulations.250  Although emissions are obviously a concern for
United States citizens, emissions are outside the realm of FMCSA's
concerns, as noted by Justice Scalia when he stated that emissions
issues "ha[ve] nothing to do with this agency's job as a safety
regulator."
251
While FMCSA is required to follow guidelines to ensure the
safety of the vehicles it registers, FMCSA is not vested with the
authority to deny registration based on broad environmental
concerns, regardless of the validity of those concerns. The Court's
decision in Department of Transportation, therefore, leads to the
conclusion that the public's concerns regarding the emission of the
Mexican motor carriers will remain unaddressed unless and until
Congress expands DOT's, and thereby FMCSA's, authority. While
the executive branch of government has performed some sort of
EIS,252 there is no indication that presidential action will extend
beyond this initial step. That is to say, there is no indication that the
President will take the necessary steps to enforce emissions
regulation among the Mexican motor carriers, thereby leaving the
concerns of interested parties unaddressed.
The Court's decision illustrates the limited extent of agency
authority in relation to presidential authority. Because the actions of
President Bush, and not the actions of FMCSA, were ultimately
responsible for the increased volume of cross-border traffic, FMCSA
250. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. Although required to
register anyone meeting registration requirements, the FMCSA maintains a
NAFTA safety statistics database, where interested parties can view the following
information regarding motor carriers domiciled in the United States, Mexico, or
Canada with an active DOT number: general statistics (which includes Census,
Inspection, Compliance Review, Traffic Enforcement, and Crash data and border
crossing data by state and port of entry), program measures (which includes
information on Roadside Inspections, Compliance Reviews, and Traffic
Enforcement), and carrier safety performance (which includes a summary of crash
data). Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Analysis & Information
Online, NAFTA Safety Stats, supra note 245.
251. Doug Abrahms, Justices Question Agency's Role in Mexican Truck Case,
News from the Border, available at
http://www.thebta.org/syndicate/news/archives/20O4_04.html (last visited March
28, 2005).
252. Local 70 Takes Cross-Border Trucking to Court, supra note 246. This
EIS was minimal and only considered information on Mexican motor carriers from
the year 2000. Id.
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was not required to consider the foreseeable environmental effects of
the regulations even though the promulgation of the regulations
immediately opened the border to Mexican motor carriers. 253 One
can assume that FMCSA had no options other than to promulgate the
new regulations allowing border crossing because the President
ordered their promulgation. The President, similarly, had no choice
other than to force reform of the country's registration policies to
bring the United States into compliance with NAFTA.254 This
demonstrates that the agency must bow to the President's authority,
which in turn must bow to the country's obligations regarding foreign
policy. An agency must consider the environmental impact of its
actions before making a decision; the President, however, is not
required to do the same.255 The issue has been stated: "Can the
President's foreign affairs powers limit the scope of an EIS required
by Congress? ' 256  The Court indirectly resolved this issue in the
affirmative, signaling that as long as it is the President's actions (and
not the agency's) that will cause the feared environmental effects, the
President's foreign affairs powers can indeed limit the scope of an
otherwise required EIS.
C. Legislative Impact
Interested parties fear that those taking action are sacrificing the
sanctity of certain laws of the United States in order to comply with
international treaties such as NAFTA. Although Congress initially
opposed the opening of the border due to environmental and safety
concerns and attempted to slow the progress of the President's
attempts through enacting the Appropriations Act,257 Congress has
yet to address the President's environmental obligations in dealings
with other countries. It has been noted that unless Congress acts to
253. See supra notes 142, 205 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 50-59, 131 and accompanying text. In briefs filed with
the Court, "the Bush administration noted that the president is not obligated to meet
the air standards in dealing with a foreign country." Joe Cantlupe, High Court
Considers Mexican Trucking, News from the Border, April 22, 2004, available at
http://www.thebta.org/syndicate/news/archives/2004_04.html.
255. Kirkland, supra note 205.
256. Shirey, supra note 221, at 986.
257. Id. at 966-67.
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remedy the situation, the laws of the United States will continue to
come in second to international priorities:
As communication and transportation become faster,
international ties become stronger, and
interrelationships between domestic actions and
international actions become more complex, the
impacts of international obligations on the domestic
environment will increase. Congress should face the
issue squarely and amend U.S. environmental laws to
take into consideration how these impacts should fit in
the scheme of international commerce. Once Congress
has spoken, treaty negotiators and others responsible
for determining the United States's [sic] international
obligations will know what their environmental
constraints are.258
Congress must, therefore, perform a balancing test and determine
which interest should come first: the integrity of the country's
environment or the country's demonstration of good will towards its
neighbors. 259  Obviously, both interests are crucial, and, ideally,
Congress will recognize the need for action, and will then act for the
benefit of both national concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Department of Transportation affects
more parties than the DOT - the decision has far-reaching effects,
which extend beyond our borders. As a result of this decision,
Mexican motor carriers may be able to avoid United States emissions
laws indefinitely. Agencies carrying out presidential orders relating
258. Id. at 998.
259. It has been noted that the President's actions in lifting the moratorium
without forcing Mexican motor carriers to comply with United States' laws is
"nothing less than an attempt to sacrifice environmental laws for monetary gain."
Teamsters Local 70 Online, July 2004: Supreme Court Here We Come, available at
http://www.Teamsterslocal70.org/local%2070%20takes%20cross-border.htm (last
visited March 28, 2005). That being a widely held view, this is undoubtedly an
issue Congress should address.
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to foreign policy may not have to assess the environmental impacts
of those actions. The President may be able to continue disregarding
certain established laws, public concern, and the environmental
implications of decisions executed in the interest of international
relations. All of these results are possible and probable to some
degree unless Congress takes the Court's decision in Department of
Transportation as an indication that it is time for policy clarification
and reformation.
